In order to provide certified security services we must provide indicators that can measure the level of assurance that a complex business process can offer. Unfortunately the formulation of security indicators is not amenable to efficient algorithms able to evaluate the level of assurance of complex process from its components.
INTRODUCTION
Some emerging trends are shaping the business of the future: from a technological perspective highly dynamic service-oriented architectures (SOA) with a distributed security administration have emerged as the architectures of choice.
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from a standards and regulatory perspective the complexity of requirements has increased especially with respect to security, privacy, and accountability.
Due to these emerging trends, companies can neither deliver nor accept best-effort software solutions that cannot be subject to independent audits. This applies to all software components and services, but in particular to the security solutions implementing the controls that are essential for auditing. In a nutshell companies must provide certified assurance services to their customers and expect assured services from their contractors. The American Institute of Public Accountants and the International Federation of Accountants started to address problems and opportunities in this area by developing best practices for "Assurance and Trust Services" for Web and IT applications 1 (see also [9] ). In order to provide certified assurance services we must first provide indicators that can measure security state of a process or the level of assurance available to another process. In other words we must realize in the security and trust domain those notions that are universally accepted in the management and accounting community to provide certifiable assurance of financial services and sound business risk management. Looking at CoBIT, the Information Systems Audit and Control Association's framework of indicators, processes and best practices for IT governance and control in companies [13] , we find Key Goal Indicators (KGI) establishing measurable business objectives that must be reached to obtain successful services, whereas Key Performance Indicators (KPI) set up the measures on the business or technological infrastructure (such as the number of "negative" events) that allow evaluating the level of goal achievement. To account for the hierarchical structure of business processes high-level KGI/KPI can be mapped to KGI/KPI at lower business levels.
The notions that we need are the following ones [16] :
Assurance Indicator is a measurable indicator negotiated by a client and a contractor to show that the client's business assurance goals are addressed e.g. the number of attacks or breaches that affect the clients' assets.
Security Indicator measures technical security features used by contractors to achieve a high level of security, e.g. presence and quality of protection and regulatory models.
CoBIT's indicators and these indicators are dual in the same way that service engineering and security engineering are dual methodologies. Intuitively, a goal indicator points to a better business, 1 See for example http://www.webtrust.org/overview.htm thus a system with more features. Assurance indicators point to a more secure system, thus a system with less troubles. Performance indicators define events that are bad for business while a security indicator points to events that are good for security such as passing from RBAC to RBAC with separation of duty. Unfortunately, having an indicator is not enough: business processes are complex and, to scale up to industry level case studies, we must be able to derive the global indicators for a process by combining the indicator for a global business process from its components.
Further we would like to analyze several business process alternatives and choose the one which provides the best protection.
The contribution of this paper
In our previous paper [20] we introduced the notion of Protection Appraisal DAG and provided an algorithm for the construction of such DAG from a business process. Our initial assumption was that one could then use with little or no modification the polynomial time algorithms used for hypergraph. In particular, an algorithm for finding the "shortest" (optimal) path should aggregate indicators of atomic activities of a business process and select the more secure concrete business process among various design alternatives.
Unfortunately some natural practical assurance indicators require using non-superior/non-inferior functions (see Example 6 in Section 3) which are not amenable to existing efficient algorithms.
In this paper we show an algorithm based on FD-Graphs (a variant of directed hyper-graphs) that can be used to compute in polynomial time (i) the overall assurance indicator of a complex business process from its components for arbitrary monotone composition functions, (ii) the subpart of the business process that is responsible for such assurance indicator (i.e. the best security alternative).
OUTSOURCING LOAN PROCESSING
To make the discussion more concrete we start here with a running example 2 . Our case scenario is a bank holding company which outsources loan processing to semi-independent subsidiaries.
We start by defining a business process and its stakeholders: Here, the subsidiary executes the BP shown in Figure 1 to fulfil the assigned task. The BP is depicted using BPMN (Business Process Management Notation) [22] , a widely used notation. EXAMPLE 1. The holding company is the client. The contractor in the scenario is the subsidiary because it takes a responsibility to provide some service negotiated with the client. Credit bureaus are subcontractors which provide a specific service (external rating check). To avoid the confusion with the holding company, we use term "customer" for the subject which want to receive a loan.
Together with provision of a good quality of service (e.g. high response time) contractors should provide a good quality of protection for client's data (e.g. low number of viruses corrupting client's Obviously to provide such quality of protection contractors should implement a number of security controls and policies (e.g. install antivirus, enforce a policy for using e-mails). To assess the internal security of the BP the contractor can use what we called security indicators such as the frequency of anti-virus updates, the presence of sophisticated access control models and so on [16] .
The key point is what indicators should be used by the client to assess that the appropriate level of quality of protection is in place. As argued in [16] and also in [12, Chap.3] , internal security indicators are not appropriate for the client. It should rather use what we termed assurance indicators.
EXAMPLE 2. The holding company is aware of a huge number of losses caused by asset misappropriation in this market
3 and therefore wants to be sure that the subsidiary is well-protected against these losses. So the assurance indicator can be the number of asset misappropriations which auditors have traced back to security failures in each BP activity.
In our setting, in order to get an assurance indicator of the overall process we also need to account for the possibility of choice at design and deployment time. To this extent we added a construct to BPMN for modelling explicitly the design or deployment alternatives among BP activities which accomplish the same functional goals but have different qualities. At the end of modelling phase only one of the alternatives should be left. Another issue is the choice of the subcontractors to which some parts will be outsourced. These subcontractors provide different level of assurance and have different levels of trust. These levels are not usually represented in business process model but only informally stated outside the model. We also used dashed lines to show how sub-processes are expanded. 
Appraisal FD-Graph
In order to estimate the assurance level of a BP we need a data structure derived from the BP description in BPMN. Initially, a Protection Apraisal Dag (È ) is built from a business process specified in the extended BPMN. In [20] we described the process in details and provided algorithms for building the Protection Apraisal Dag as well as for reconstructing the "optimal" business process. In short, for each activity we add an appraisal node denoting the security requirement for the activity. The appraisal nodes corresponding to sub-processes (source set) are connected to the (target) appraisal node for the decomposed activity with a decomposition edge. If several alternative sub-processes can fulfill the same activity we draw several decomposition edges leading to the same target node starting from different source sets. In case an activity is outsourced we add an additional node and connect it with the appraisal node for the outsourced activity. In this way we can use the weight on the edge to account for the trust level of the subcontractor.
However, in practice we found out that each activity contributes differently to the appraisal of a target node. This requirement is not supported by the standard hypergraph notation which assign a single weight to a hyperedge. Therefore, we use a hypergraph-like structure called Appraisal FD-Graph. The Appraisal FD-Graph is also more convenient for the algorithm which we need for the quantitative analysis. We define Appraisal FD-Graph as follows. 
A classical problem in the graph theory is finding the "shortest", i.e. optimal, path. In our approach the "shortest" FD-path determines the business process with the highest assurance (with the best value of the assurance indicator). For many propagation functions efficient algorithms already exists (e.g. for traversal cost [4] ). Unfortunately, some practical and natural propagation functions for assurance indicators do not satisfy the conditions required by the hyper-graph algorithms in the literature [4] . These conditions are based on definition of superior/inferior function.
DEFINITION 5. A function ´Ü½ ÜÒµ is a superior function if it is monotone nondecreasing in each variable and if

´Ü½ Ü Òµ Ñ Ü´´Ü½ ÜÒµµ
The notion of inferior function is obtained by the obvious swapping of less with greater and min with max. Hence, we need to adapt the traditional algorithms to find the optimal assurance solution in polynomial time.
ALGORITHM FOR MINIMAL FD-path
After creation of the Appraisal FD-Graph the contractor identifies the values of leaf appraisal nodes. In other words, it determines the values of assurance indicators for all atomic activities. The data are received from statistics available from external auditors or estimated by security experts if the activity is fulfilled by the contractor itself. If an activity is outsourced to a subcontractor the values are taken from the contract. Now we have a classical problem of finding the "shortest" path:
the root set É Ä is a set of all leaf appraisal nodes and the target is the top node, which is the fictions node denoting the quality of protection for the whole process. As it has been shown in Section 3 for some propagation functions which are appropriate for assurance indicators the existing polynomial algorithms (e.g., [4] ) are not applicable. Therefore, we need to create an algorithm which allows taking into account contribution of each activity and works with wider range of functions. W.l.o.g. we consider one protection requirement (and one assurance indicator respectively) for each activity. The goal is to find the optimal executable business process leading to the minimal value of the requirement which can be met. In other words, we want to find a minimal FD-path in Protection Apraisal Dag from a set of leaf nodes to the top appraisal node and its value if values of assurance indicators for the leaf nodes are known. The algorithm can also be if reached node (Ü) is compound then
8:
Mark the edge as traversed
9:
if All source nodes leading to Ü are traversed then
10:
Calculate value of node Ü (Î Ü );
11:
Add Ü to the working set
12:
else {if it is a simple node} 13:
Mark the alternative as reached
14:
if all alternatives for Ü are reached then
15:
Choose the minimal alternative
16:
Add Ü to the working set 17:
Store the alternative as path adopted to find the maximal FD-path, but it is doubtful whether the resulting value has some security interpretation [16] . Our algorithm extends the works of Ausiello et al. [4] and Gallo et al. [10] because the only requirement we impose on the propagation functions is that the functions is positive monotone in order to select the alternatives. Algorithm 1 informally describes the proposed procedure.
In order to make the things precise we use vector ËÇÍÊ where number of incoming compound edges for each compound node is stored. This value is equal to the number of the source nodes of the decomposition edge with which the compound node is in bijection relation. Another auxiliary vector is ÄÌ ÊAE .
It contains the number of alternative paths for each node appraisal node. This value is equal to the number of compound nodes which separately contribute to the appraisal node. À Èis used as a working set. Algorithms 2 shows the formal version of the algorithm.
We can prove the following properties of the algorihtms: LEMMA 1. It is possible to prove the following invariants:
1. Each node is visited 4 at most once.
Each edge is traversed at most once.
A node can be visited if and only if all nodes from which there is an edge leading to this node are visited.
After any number of execution of the "while" loop the set of traversed edges coincides with the set of outgoing edges for all visited nodes.
To prove 1 we use induction for the proof. The leaf nodes cannot be visited more then once since there are no edges leading to them (only outgoing ones). For the inductive case we exploit the inductive hypothesis and rule out the possibility of vising a node twice (say before all its ancestors are visited and after all its ancestors are visited) by exploiting the conditions at line 11 (for compound nodes) and line 16 (for simple nodes). For (2) an edge can be traversed only if its source node is visited. Moreover, it can be traversed only once when the node is visited. Since each node can be visited only once (invariant 1) we deduce that also every edge is traversed at most once. To prove 3, since each edge can be visited only once (invariant 2) and therefore counted only once then the conditions at lines 11 (for compound nodes) or line 16 (for simple nodes) hold only if all incoming edges are traversed. Since each edge is traversed only when its node is visited this means that all nodes from which there is an edge leading to considered node are visited.
Algorithm 2 Minimal FD-path
Finally (4): when a node is visited its outgoing edges are traversed, so all traversed edges are outgoing from visited nodes.
Using these invariants we can prove the first result of this paper: since each node is extracted/added from/to the HEAP only once and the main loop (lines 6-21) terminates in time proportional to the number of edges and nodes.
THEOREM 1. The algorithm terminates in polynomial time.
A more precise calculation can be carried out by counting the individual contribution to the execution time.
The "for" loop (lines [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] terminates when all edges of a node are scanned. Inside the loop for each edge there is a comparison at line 9. Also for each ¾ and ¾ Õ there are comparisons at lines 11 and 16 respectively. This builds up to Ç´ · Õ µ. To show that the algorithm is also correct we first need a lemma: 
Since the propagation function is positive monotone by the assumption the optimal value for the node is the minimal one.
RELATED WORK
The identification of a suitable indicator for assessment of security of a complex system is a well known problem. Some approaches suggested assigning a maturity level to the systems (e.g., the SSE-CMM), others recommended checking compliance with a security standard (e.g. ISO 17799) (e.g. [14] ), third, calculated "mean-time-to-breach" indicator using vulnerability/attack graphs [19, 23] . The most popular approach nowadays is applying risk analysis for security evaluation [6, 25] which is based on economical assessment. In our work we propose an approach which aggregates indicators of simple elements rather than assessing the whole system at once.
There is a large number of articles about access control in workflows. Bertino at al. [5] formally expressed constraints on role assignment to tasks in a workflow in order to automatically assign roles and users according to the constrains. Kang at al. [15] proposed an fine-grained and context-based access control mechanisms for inter-organizational workflows. These papers do not discuss the issue of the quality of protection that a secure workflow may achieve and only have a 0-1 notion of security.
There are few works which deal with negotiation of security indicators between clients and contractors. One of the first works claiming that security requirements must be reflected in the contract is [17] . Casola [7] et. al. building upon [11] proposed to assess security of services separately within fifteen security domain and showed an algorithm to compare security SLAs against a target SLA. A similar idea of divide-and-conquer technique was applied to evaluation of Web Service security in [26] .
The closest work to our approach is [27] . The authors proposed to choose the concrete BP among several alternatives using provided qualities as the major criterium. However they restricted themselves to sequential decompositions of BP and the functions used for aggregation of qualities are suitable for existing hypergraph algorithms. Also the authors do not consider security/assurance indicators. Jeager et. al. [21] also provided several aggregation functions for a number of service qualities (e.g. minimal execution time, cost).
A directed hypergraphs introduced in [2] is a generalization of directed graphs which allows representing many-to-one relations. Classical problem of "finding a shortest path in a hypergraph" was studied by Ausiello [4] and Gallo [10] . The algorithms proposed by the authors are quite similar and based on the algorithm of Dijkstra [8] . Unfortunately the assumptions for the used functions in the hypergraphs are to strict to be applied for our work.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have build upon the work of [20] and shown an algorithm based on FD-Graphs (a variant of directed hyper-graphs) that can be used to compute in polynomial time (i) the overall assurance indicator of a complex business process from its components for arbitrary monotone composition functions, (ii) the subpart of the business process that is responsible for such assurance indicator (i.e. the best security alternative). In contrast to standard hyper-graph algorithms [4] the propagation functions that we support must only be monotone. In this way we can capture a larger class of methods for security appraisals.
The most difficult point in the process is the concrete determination of propagation functions. We are planning to test several sets of propagation functions for various assurance indicators analyzing data from the corresponding case study in the SERENITY project. Once these functions are determined the proposed algorithm will assess all possible system configurations and if a security service is added/changed only the information about this service has to be updated. Other input parameters (weights and values of the leaf nodes) can be taken from business process specification (e.g. average time for execution of an activity) and from statistics or agreements with the partners.
The current activity is towards the creation of a tool to support security analysis. Another direction is to adapt the algorithms for dynamic changes [4, 3] .
